As a social process it involves a number of community institutions. Each institution represents decision-makers who exert influence on one another. The ultimate decision-maker in an adoption is the judge.
The judge must make a number of factual determinations. He must also make use of wide discretionary powers. He must consider such so-called guides as "the best interests of the child." He must interpret terms such as "good moral character," "proper persons to adopt," and "when practicable." How will a judge decide a dispute? How will he interpret these terms?
It is not enough to say that a judge decides an adoption dispute by "looking up the rules of law" and then applying them to the facts of the case before him. In this field, the "rules" enunciated by a legislature through its adoption statute are really statements of community preferences for certain policies. It is the application of these preferences to the facts of the case that is the difficult job for a judge. It is at this point that a judge is influenced not only by his own set of values and his own preferences for a certain result but also by a number of institutions in the community and the values they in-26 corporate.3 Governmental institutions, individual families, communication institutions, health institutions, and religious institutions have an impact on the decision he reaches in the case before him. In this paper an attempt will be made to discuss the role of these institutions in the decision-making process as well as to present recommendations for their future role. Also, there will be a discussion of the values that are promoted by some of these institutions in the adoption process.
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
Legislative and executive influence.? Governmental institutions at all levels have some impact on decision-making in an adoption case. These institutions include the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, lawyers as officers of the court, administrative tribunals, and federal, state, and local welfare agencies.
Legislation gives adoption a legal base. There was no common law of adoption. In fact, Massachusetts was the first state to provide legal machinery to effectuate the adoption of a child.4 In 1926, seventy-five years after the Massachusetts act was passed, England enacted its adoption statute.5
Unlike the Roman law, in which the primary concern of adoption was the continuity of the adopter's family and in which emphasis was placed on inheritance and succession,6 adoption legislation in the United States has been based primarily on the welfare of Since the law of adoption is statutory, the major influence on a judge's decision is the adoption legislation itself. It is his guide, and it reflects much of the prevalent adoption practice. Generally, adoption legislation has as its aim the protection of children by enunciating a policy of promoting their physical and emotional well-being. Also, it strives to be fair to his natural and adoptive parents by including provisions designed to protect their rights and interests.
In drafting state legislation in this field, legislators are influenced by the views of interested local groups (e.g., public and private social welfare agencies, professional associations, and civic organizations). Also, they are affected by the recommendations of the federal government, most directly by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In the adoption field the Children's Bureau has provided strong leadership recently by the publication of a manual entitled Legislative Guides for the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children? Certain provisions reflecting the policies mentioned above will be briefly discussed and criticized.
A major contribution made by the Bureau in its suggested legislation is in the requirement that, in a nonrelative adoption, the placement must be made by a licensed social service agency and that judicial proceeding to terminate the rights of the natural parents in the child must antedate the petition for adoption. The requirement of agency placements in non-relative adoptions has been controversial for many years.9 There are some who argue that it cannot be proved that children thrive better in a home chosen by an agency than in one chosen by private parties. There are too many variables, and the task of reaching any serious conclusion is, of course, difficult.10 There are risks inherent in every adoption. Not only is the lessening of risks important in the requirement of agency placement, but also the opportunity for regulation. Regulation makes possible the policing of those socially desired goals of adoption practice or those values in adoption which the enlightened and interested members of the community seek to promote. Involvement by the government through institutions, such as public child welfare agencies or by private institutions through private agencies, is justified at the placement stage because of the community^ proper concern for the child's well-being as well as that of the natural and adoptive parents. It is at this point that the community's concern is most meaningful. The court-ordered social investigation that occurs in many states after the child has been in the adoptive parents' home for anywhere from six months to a year might be too late to be healthy for the child or fair to his parents. Agency placement at the beginning of the adoption process can, in the long run, lessen the likelihood of a child's being shifted from one home to another and then to a third. It can prevent hardships and disappointments that would result if a court determined that a child ought to be removed from a home in which the prospective adoptive parents, after having the child in their home for a relatively long period of time, had become fond of him. It can provide the most adequate protection for all the parties.
The insistence in the Children's Bureau manual that termination of parental rights and responsibilities in the child precede the actual adoption and that the termination decree provide for temporary guardianship and for legal custody of the child is worthy of consideration by the states. There are two good reasons in support of the procedure. Separate termination and adoption proceedings lessen the opportunity for confusion of issues relevant to termination with issues pertinent to adoption. Also, the confusion of the child's status during the period from the natural parent's relinquishment or release to the time of placement or the judicial decree of adoption (depending on the particular procedure used) is greatly diminished. Many agencies find that unless the child's status is clearly ascertainable when they obtain the child, their area of functioning is uncertain. They also find that the unmarried mother who has decided to give up her child for adoption wants to be sure of the child's well-being as well as her own responsibilities or freedom from them. The belief in the field is that early voluntary termination helps toward clarity and ease of planning for the child's life.
Early involuntary termination of parental rights also can be most beneficial to the child. The Children's Bureau manual suggests that abandonment, substantial and continuous or repeated neglect, incapacity to discharge parental responsibilities, or evidence that the presumptive parent is not a natural parent of the child be grounds for involuntary termination.11 The New York State Legislature has refined its neglect provision further, with the twin goals of promoting the child's wellbeing and being fair to the natural parents. In New York it was found that a great many children had become accustomed to foster care as a way of life. They had lost their opportunity for adoption because they had passed the age of "adoptability."12 In 19S9, the New York Legislature passed the "permanently neglected child" statute, "ii/TM, H(b).
12 It has been found that it is more difficult to place children six years old and older than it is to place infants. Adjustments are more difficult for the older child than for the younger one. which gives jurisdiction to the Children's Court to terminate parental rights in a proceeding brought by an agency having the child in its care. In order for an agency to be successful in its claim for custody with power to consent to the child's adoption, it must show that the child's parents have failed substantially and continuously for a year or more to maintain contact with him "although physically and financially able to do so" and "notwithstanding the diligent efforts of such agency to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship."13 The Children's Bureau manual provides that parental consent to an adoption must be written and acknowledged before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments and must be witnessed by a representative of a child-placement agency or of the court. a private Illinois child welfare agency. The agency had received custody of the child four days after his birth by virtue of purported surrenders and consents executed by both natural parents about ninety-six hours after the birth of the child. The mother claimed that her surrender and consent were given to the agency through fraud and duress. She maintained that at the time she signed the documents she was under the influence of drugs, was emotionally troubled, was misinformed about the nature and effect of the documents, and was fraudulently induced to sign the papers by her husband, who had misrepresented certain facts to her.
According to the opinion of the Illinois appellate court, the natural mother had been acting under the mistaken belief that her surrender of her child to the child welfare agency was only temporary and that she could get her baby back within a year. The representative of the child welfare agency who obtained the parents' consents knew of these misunderstandings yet did nothing at the time of the signing of the forms to dispel them. In granting relief to the natural mother, the court emphasized the duty to inform her of the nature of the acts she was performing. The absence of information about the surrender and consent was tantamount to deception and fraud, making her actions revocable.
Lawyers.?If we take seriously what Sophonisba Breckinridge wrote almost thirty years ago, lawyers would play an insignificant role in the adoption process, and their influence on a judge would be minimal. Miss Breckinridge asked whether adoption of children was "a truly judicial procedure"16 ?i.e., a procedure to decide a dispute. She thought that no adoption should result if there was a dispute. Once the issue of the competence of the natural parents was settled, she considered the completion of an adoption a simple ministerial act.
Her idea was not far from what in fact was the practice in the early part of this century in some southern states as well as in Texas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania.17 Save for Miss Breckinridge's important qualification of a "sound and thorough social inquiry" before transfer of custody of a child from his natural parents to his adoptive parents, adoption procedures in those states were very much like the formalities of a real-estate transfer.
Perhaps it is appropriate today to study what meaningful part the lawyer can perform in the adoption process. His role in divorce problems has been challenged by a lawyer who has stated: I see no reason why social workers could not handle any potential divorce proceedings by investigating the persons involved and making a considered recommendation to the court. Any financial settlements that had to be reached could be handled by lawyers and the unhappy situation resolved in a civilized manner.18
Similarly, a number of writers have minimized the role of the lawyer in the adoption process. They have relegated the lawyer to performing two tasks: counseling and completing forms.19 However, these are only a part When there are competing claims for the rights to the custody, control, and company of a child, the lawyer's role is that of direct participant in the judicial process. He is in his familiar arena?an adversary proceeding in court. He represents his client's interests by persuading the judge that the kind of disposition of the case for which he argues is the proper one. As counsel for the natural mother, he may be attempting to show that her consent was obtained through fraud. As counsel for the natural father, he may be attempting to prove the necessity for the father's consent, which the father has not given and will not give. As counsel for hopeful parents, he may be attempting to challenge an agency's rejection of the couple. As counsel for the agency, he may defend the decision to reject an applicant.
Perhaps a lawyer ought to have a role to play as counsel for the child in an adoption proceeding. is what we are asking of him when we say that special legal representation for a child would be an intrusion into the judicial function.
There is precedent for appointing counsel for children.24 In fact, a much stronger case can be made for establishing the position of attorney for the child in an adoption proceeding than for having counsel in juvenile-court proceedings. For years, a battle has been waged over the question whether there is a right to counsel in the juvenile court. Pitted against the notion that even though, within those provisions of the Constitution which prescribe certain standards and procedures for criminal proceedings, the juvenile court proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, is the fact that an individual's rights and liberties are at stake and, an argument runs, these rights should be protected in the same manner as practiced in adult criminal courts. However, assuming the right to counsel is essential, there is some question about whether the lawyer's appearance will detract from the informality of the proceedings and thus whether his participation will conflict with the philosophy underlying the establishment of the court. These problems are still being debated even though the child's right to counsel is almost an established fact.25 But an adoption proceeding is neither 
tion. It is valuable to note what the judge wrote in his opinion:
The child has regarded and refers to plaintiffs as mother and father and accords them the admiration, obedience, love and devotion of a son. It is the child's expressed desire to be adopted by the plaintiffs and to be personally known as Robert Dickinson Jacques. This he has made known to his natural father. The situation which distresses the father most is the child's willingness to have his name changed. The father's attitude in this respect has so disturbed the child that from the witness stand he expressed a wish that the court make a decision for him.
The adoptive child persisted in his desire to be adopted, even though subject to proper vigorous cross-examination concerning the legal and moral effect of permitting the adoption. The boy's testimony and the report of the State Board of Child Welfare . . . indicates his understanding and desire with respect to these proceedings.
There could be no doubt in any one's mind that the adoptive child is above average intelligence for one his age and that he has attained that ripened discretion which enables him to determine what his own interests and welfare demands, and that he possesses the impartial acumen necessary to make an accurate appraisal of the facts surrounding the proceedings.31
It seems that the judge was struck by the child's behavior on the stand.
Would not the child have been spared what must have been a serious emotional experience in the courtroom by having a personal legal representative?
Without counsel a child can lack protection from agency policies and decisions. Agencies may believe they are representing children in their custody as a lawyer would. Sometimes, however, what they consider to be in the best interests of the child may be clouded by their concern for the best interests of the agency. Someone should be available to protect the child's interests. That person should be free from con-
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cerns for administrative regularity, conflicts, and precedents for political repercussions. Note what happened in In re Jewish Child Care Association?2 In that case a writ of habeas corpus was brought by an agency to obtain a child from foster parents with whom it had placed the child. The child had lived with the foster parents for almost her entire life. When the foster parents refused to give up the child, the agency brought the suit.
During the first year of the fosterhome arrangement the foster parents had expressed a desire to adopt the child but had been told that theirs was a boarding home and that adoption was out of the question. Three years later, they were asked to sign a paper to the effect that the child had been placed with them for boarding purposes only. The foster parents persisted in their desire to adopt the child but were repeatedly told that they could not do so. Yet the child had remained with them for four and one-half of her five years of life. There was nothing in the court's opinion to indicate that the child's natural mother cared for the child or had any interest in her.
The agency wanted the child removed from the home of the foster parents. Even though the agency stated that the foster parents were well qualified in every respect, had taken good care of the child, and were providing her with an excellent home environment, it thought that they had become too attached to the child and that a conflict could arise between the child's loyalty to her natural parent and to her foster What is important and missing in the opinion is an expression of the child's feelings, how she perceived the situation, and what her desires were. Perhaps a lawyer could have brought these factors to the court's attention.
The lawyer's role in the adoption process should not be minimized or confined to office practice. The lawyer is the protector of the individual's rights. In the cases referred to, there were justiciable issues with important effects on the interests, well-being, and expectations of many people. In our society such disputes have been assigned for decision to the court, with its tradition of fair procedures, its sanctions, and the respect afforded it by the community.
Child welfare agencies.?Child welfare agencies have been the traditional investigative arm of the court, and their influence on the judge has been direct and profound. In recent years it has been the practice in many American jurisdictions, before an adoption is decreed, to provide the court with a study of the child, his natural parents, and his adoptive parents. Whether the study is mandatory or discretionary varies according to the particular state.35
The court-ordered social investigation is crucially important to the judge. It has a recommending function. Note the language of the Illinois statute:
The court shall appoint an agency or a person deemed competent by the court to investigate accurately, fully, and promptly, the allegations contained in the petition; the 3(1 Ibid., at 230-31; 156 N.E. 2d, at 704. character, reputation, and general standing in the community of the petitioners; the religious faith of the petitioners and, if ascertainable, of the child sought to be adopted; and whether the petitioners are proper persons to adopt the child and whether the child is a proper subject of adoption.36
In order to determine "whether the petitioners are proper persons to adopt the child and whether the child is a proper subject of adoption," the social worker has to make a number of judgments and predictions. He must be concerned with whether the proposed adoptive parents will be satisfactory not only immediately but for the total span of childhood years and thereafter. This is the same question with which the caseworker must be faced at the placement stage. As David Fanshel has stated, "the caseworker must select couples who would appear to have the ingredients necessary for good performance with the child not only as an infant, but also when he becomes a toddler, a preschooler, a ten-year-old, an To illustrate how a judge is impressed with using the values suggested by Kadushin to determine a proper set of adoptive parents, In re Jacques*2 is relevant. The judge wrote this about the parents:
The home of the plaintiffs is more than modest and adequate. It is situated in a very pleasant residential section and is within walking distance of schools and church. There is no question of the financial ability of the plaintiffs to provide in a proper fashion, not only for their own three children, but for the child sought to be adopted as well.43
It has been shown beyond doubt that plaintiffs are capable, conscientious, of fine character, maintain a fine home, are solicitous of the welfare of the child sought to be adopted, and would make excellent parents, and are good, clean, wholesome, God-fearing Christian people with a real genuine parental affection for the young man.44
There has been a great deal of discussion about the values promoted by social agencies in their placement practices.45 It is unfair, however, to categorically indict all agencies for the rigidity of a few or to suggest that there is a fixed hierarchy of values that are promoted through agency practices.46 As Kadushin pointed out, economics plays an important part in the formula- It is not uncommon for the press to interest itself in custody and adoption disputes and to exert pressure on social welfare agencies to allow a child to remain with a couple who want to adopt him, when the welfare agency, for reasons it will not reveal, wants to remove the child.48 A recent case which received publicity concerned an attempt by a New Jersey welfare agency to remove a four-year-old girl from the home of her foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. Combs, who wanted to adopt her. From the press reports it seemed that the decisive factor in the case was that Alice Marie, press reports. The focus of the reports was on the welfare department's emphasis on "enlightenment," suggesting that "affection" was less important. In fact, the New York Times titled its report: "Parents Plead Love in BrightGirl Case."51 This is an appealing approach for purposes of community identification and support. Probably it would have had the same attraction and support had the case involved foster parents whom the welfare department considered "too poor" for adoptive parenthood. For the welfare department not to accept for adoptive parenthood a couple not intellectually keen or not economically affluent is an indictment against a large number of community parents. In the long run, welfare agency policies are dependent upon community suppport, and compliance with any particular decision is affected by community attitudes. In competing with the press for support for its decision in a dispute like the one under discussion, welfare agencies are at a disadvantage. Because of confidentiality, the agencies are unable to disclose to the community all the facts of a particular case. What is available to the agencies is the opportunity through a continuous and sustained program to explain and seek community acceptance of their policies and programs. In fact, a mandate is given them by the Child Welfare League of America Standards for Adoption Service:
It is necessary to obtain public interest, understanding and support for development of the required resources, adequate financing, effective legislation and maintenance of standards.
The public should be informed of the services and safeguards which the unmarried 51 New York Times, March 9, 1960, pp. 1, 27. mother and other parents, the child and the adoptive parents need, and which are offered only by social agencies.
Efforts should be made to change community attitudes and to help the public understand the facts.52
There seems to be a direct concern for the value in those states that require that "religion" be considered in the disposition of the case.61 In either situation, the result is to influence the judge in his decision.
To write of adoption that it is a juridical act creating certain civil relations between two persons is to state a conclusion rather than a description. Adoption is not an act; it is a process. Many people and institutions have participated in this process by the time a final decree of adoption is granted by a court. The decisions that have been made comprise not only the readily identifiable ones of, for example, the natural mother's decision to place the child with a particular family, the decision of the court staff to recommend the adoption through its social-investigation report, the decision of the judge to ap-prove the adoption, but also include other less obvious ones throughout the process. The other decision-makers may be less dramatic, but their impact is no less important. If, therefore, there are to be effective and meaningful discussions about the adoption process, whether the purpose of these discussions is to evaluate, reform, or revise the process, the participation of these people is necessary.
There is a noticeable promotion of values in the adoption process. To suggest that enhancing "the best interests of the child" is the goal in adoption clouds what is really occurring. It is important to realize that values are promoted and to question whether these values are either meaningful or proper in establishing a parent-child relationship. Once the policies are ascertained, the entire adoption process should be designed to protect, foster, and develop these social values. An attempt has been made to indicate that it is consistent with promoting the welfare and wellbeing (values generally accepted as vital in the process) of the child and of his natural and adoptive parents for the state to control the reorganization of a family. It is also consistent with this policy to have a child represented by counsel in a dispute regarding the reorganization of his family relationships. Questions have been raised about social welfare agencies' imposing some values on applicants or encouraging other values which may be in conflict with those held by some members of the community. These are questions for investigation and thought by interested community decision-makers.
